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Abstract
This paper proposes nonparametric statistical procedures for analyzing discrete choice
models of affective decision making. We make two contributions to the literature on behavioral
economics. Namely, we propose a procedure for eliciting the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
an intrapersonal, potential game as well as randomized sign tests for dependent observations
on game-theoretic models of affective decision making. This methodology is illustrated in the
context of a hypothetical experiment — the Casino Game.
Keywords: Behavioral economics, Affective decision making, Intrapersonal potential games,
Randomized sign tests, Dependent observations, Adapted sequences, Martingale-difference
sequences
JEL Classification: C12, C32, C35, C72, C91, D11, D81
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1 Introduction
Casinos are natural laboratories for studying affective decision making (ADM). Here we see indi-
viduals engaged in risk taking behavior, where each outcome has both a monetary and an affective
or emotional payoff. Probably the best examples are the video slot machines. Despite knowing
that the payback for these machines may, on average, be about 75 to 80 percent — see Royer
(2003) – these machines together with reel slots make up 80 percent of casinos’ revenues. In
Nevada alone this amounts to $7.2 billion a year. Why? Why pay a dollar to get, on average,
75 or 80 cents in return? The answer is simple. These games are fun to play — see Krieger and
Reber (2005) or the discussion of video slots in Royer (2003). That is, the affective payoff more
than compensates for the potential monetary loss, the “casino affect.”1
The interplay between emotion and cognition in decision making is a well-studied topic in
cognitive psychology — see Mellers and Schwartz (1999) and the references therein–and more
recently in cognitive neuroscience— see Damasio (1994), Ledoux (1996), and Rolls (1999). In the
cognitive psychology literature, the descriptive model of individual decision making under risk
is prospect theory, due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The cognitive neuroscience literature
attempts to correlate this behavior with neural activity in different regions of the brain, using
neuroimaging techniques — see Breiter et al. (2001) and Ernst et al. (2004).
Prospect theory is only one of the many variants of expected utility theory seeking to describe
choice under risk – see Camerer’s survey article, 8.III, in Hagel and Roth (1995) and Starmer’s
survey article, Chapter 4, in Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2004). Common to all of these
models is the unchallenged assumption that choice under uncertainty derives from maximization
of preferences. This is the rational agent paradigm that dominates economic theory — see Kreps
(1990) and MasColell et al. (1995). An alternative paradigm for ADM has recently been proposed
by Bracha (2005). In her model, the interaction between cognitive and affective neural processes
is described as an intrapersonal potential game where observed behavior is a Nash equilibrium
of the game resulting from simultaneous play of the cognitive and affective processes. Recall
that a potential game is a strategic-form game where the payoff functions of the players can be
represented by a single real-valued function of the outcomes in the payoff matrix, the potential
— see Monderer and Shapley (1996).
In this paper, we consider the implications of her model for a hypothetical experiment in
discrete choice under risk — the Casino Game. The experimental design was suggested in part by
a recent paper of Ernst et al. (2004) where they consider a variant of the popular TV game show:
“The Wheel of Fortune.” We derive the testable implications of her model for this experiment
from Sprumont’s paper (2000) on collective choice theories and Ibragimov and Brown’ (2005)
1In the video slot example, you are willing to pay 20 to 25 cents for the entertainment.
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paper on randomized sign tests for dependent observations. That is, given a finite sequence
of dependent observations on subjects choosing between decks of cards with random monetary
payoffs paired with subjects choosing between decks of cards with the same random monetary
payoffs, but containing affective payoffs, images, we test the null hypothesis that the conditional
distributions of choices are the same in both groups against the alternative hypothesis that the
conditional distributions of choices differ as predicted by Bracha’s model – the Casino Affect. The
proposed test has very good power, even in small samples.
The analysis in the present paper is based on the new sign tests developed in Ibragimov and
Brown (2005) that provide a device for testing for conditionally symmetric martingale-difference
assumptions as well as for testing that conditional distributions of two (arbitrary) adapted se-
quences are the same. The foundation for the results in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) is given by
general estimates for the tail probabilities of sums of signs of random variables (r.v.’s) forming a
conditionally symmetric martingale-difference sequence or signs of differences of the components of
two adapted sequences of interest. The bounds give sharp (i.e., attainable either in finite samples
or in the limit) estimates for these tail probabilities in terms of (generalized) moments of sums of
i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v.’s (or corresponding moments of Binomial distributions) and standard normal
r.v.’s (see Corollaries 2, 3, 6 and 7). Similar estimates hold as well for expectations of arbitrary
functions of the signs that are convex in each of their arguments (Theorem 5 and Corollary 5). The
bounds in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) are based on the results that demonstrate that random-
ization over zero values of three-valued r.v.’s in a conditionally symmetric martingale-difference
sequence produces a stream of i.i.d. symmetric Bernoulli r.v.’s and thus reduces the problem of
estimating the critical values of the tests to computing the quantiles or moments of Binomial or
normal distributions (Theorem 4 and Corollary 1). The same is the case for randomization over
ties in sign tests for equality of conditional distributions of two adapted sequences (see Theorem
6 and Corollary 4).
The analysis in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) and in this paper is based, in large part, on general
characterization results for two-valued martingale difference sequences and multiplicative forms
obtained recently in Sharakhmetov and Ibragimov (2002) (see also de la Peña and Ibragimov, 2003,
and de la Peña, Ibragimov and Sharakhmetov, 2003). These characterization results reviewed in
Section 2 demonstrate, in particular, that martingale-difference sequences consisting of r.v.’s each
of which takes two values are, in fact, sequences of independent r.v.’s. The results allow one to
reduce the study of many problems for three-valued martingales to the case of i.i.d. symmetric
Bernoulli r.v.’s and provide the key to the development of sign tests for dependent observations.
There are many studies focusing on procedures for dealing with ties in independent observa-
tions (see Coakley and Heise, 1996, for a review and comparisons of sign tests in the presence of
ties). Basing the conclusions on a size and power study, Coakley and Heise (1996) recommended
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using the asymptotic uniformly most powerful non-randomized (ANU) test due to Putter (1955)
if ties occur in the sign test. The results obtained by Putter (1955) show that randomization
over ties reduces the exact power of the sign test and the asymptotic efficiency of the sign test.
It is known, however, that the exact version of the ANU test is conservative for small samples
compared to both its randomized conditional version as well as to ANU (see Coakley and Heise,
1996; Wittkowski, 1998). The estimates obtained in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) shed new light
on sign tests comparisons and suggest that randomization over ties leads, in general, to more
conservative unconditional sign tests since it provides bounds for the tail probabilities of signs in
terms of generalized moments of i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v.’s. According to the results in Ibragimov and
Brown (2005), the advantage of randomization over ties or zero observations is that it allows one
to use the sign tests in the presence of dependence while nonrandomized sign tests can only be
used in the case of independence in data. In this regard, the results in that paper demonstrate
that sign tests have the important property of robustness to dependence. Sign tests have other
appealing properties.
First, a simple linear transformation of a test statistic based on signs leads to a Binomial
distribution, and, thus, its distribution can be computed exactly. This is in contrast to other
commonly used test statistics for which the exact distributions are frequently unknown. Even if
known, the exact distributions of such test statistics are usually difficult to compute and have to
be obtained by relying on computationally intensive algorithms or Monte-Carlo techniques.
The second important property of sign tests is that they can be applied in the case of a small
number of observations. This is very important since large sample approximations, e.g., those
based on the central limit theorems, require special regularity assumptions on the distribution of
the observations such as existence of the second or higher moments or identical distribution.
The third property of sign tests is their robustness to distributional assumptions. Sign tests
can be used for statistical inference in models driven by innovations with heavy-tailedness since the
distributions of their test statistics are known under very mild assumptions such as symmetry.
Robustness of sign tests is appealing since it has been shown in numerous studies that many
time series encountered in economics and finance are heavy-tailed and involve r.v.’s X with the
power tail decline P (|X| > x) ∼ x−α (see the discussion in Ibragimov, 2004, 2005, and references
therein). One should also emphasize here that the limiting distributions for test statistics in
setups based on heavy-tailedness assumptions are non-standard and usually involve functionals of
stable processes; therefore, one has to rely on computationally intensive Monte-Carlo simulations
to compute the critical values of the tests.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the characterization results for two-valued
martingale difference sequences and multiplicative forms in Sharakhmetov and Ibragimov (2002)
that provide the basis for the analysis in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) and in this paper. In Section
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3, we review the main results of Ibragimov and Brown (2005) on the distributional properties of
sign tests for martingale-difference sequences that are the key to the development of statistical
procedures based on signs of dependent observations in subsequent sections. Section 4 describes
the sign tests of Ibragimov and Brown (2005) derived from the results obtained in Section 3. These
sign tests provide the statistical procedures for testing for conditionally symmetric martingale-
difference assumptions as well as for testing that conditional distributions of two (arbitrary)
adapted sequences are the same.2 In Section 5, we explain in details the experimental design of
the Casino Game and in Section 6 we apply the statistical analysis developed in Sections 3 and 4
to the Casino Game.
2 Probabilistic Foundations of the Analysis3
Let (Ω,=, P ) be a probability space equipped with a filtration =0 = (Ω, ∅) ⊆ =1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ =.
Further, let (at)∞t=1 and (bt)
∞
t=1 be arbitrary sequences of real numbers such that at 6= bt for all t.
The key to the analysis in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) and in this paper is provided by
the following theorems. These theorems are consequences of more general results obtained in
Sharakhmetov and Ibragimov (2002) that show that r.v.’s taking k+1 values form a multiplicative
system of order k if and only if they are jointly independent (see also de la Peña and Ibragimov,
2003; de la Peña, Ibragimov and Sharakhmetov, 2003). These results imply, in particular, that
r.v.’s each taking two values form a martingale-difference sequence if and only if they are jointly
independent.
To illustrate the main ideas of the proof, we first consider the case of r.v.’s taking values ±1.
In what follows, I(·) stands for the indicator function.
Theorem 1 If r.v.’s Ut, t = 1, 2, ..., form a martingale-difference sequence with respect to a
filtration (=t)t and are such that P (Ut = 1) = P (Ut = −1) = 1/2 for all t, then they are jointly
independent.
Proof It is easy to see that, under the assumptions of the theorem, one has that, for all 1 <
`1 < `2 < · · · < `k, k = 2, 3, ...,




= E(U`1 ...U`k−1 × 0) = 0 (1)
2For completeness of the presentation, the complete proofs of the results in Sections 2-4 are provided.
3An excellent introduction to the theory of martingales, including discussions of filtrations, adapted stochastic
processes and martingale-difference sequences may be found in Grimmett and Stirzaker (2001).
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It is easy to see that, for xt ∈ {−1, 1}, I(Xt = xt) = (1 + xtUt)/2. Consequently, for all
1 ≤ j1 < j2 < · · · < jm, m = 2, 3, ..., and any xjk ∈ {−1, 1}, k = 1, 2, ...,m, we have




















= P (Uj1 = xj1)P (Uj2 = xj2)...P (Ujm = xjm)
by (1). ¥
The proof of the analogue of the result in the case of r.v.’s each of which takes arbitrary two
values is completely similar and the following more general result holds.
Theorem 2 If r.v.’s Xt, t = 1, 2, ..., form a martingale-difference sequence with respect to a
filtration (=t)t and each of them takes two (not necessarily the same for all t) values {at, bt},
then they are jointly independent.
Proof Let the random variable Xt take the values at and bt, at 6= bt, with probabilities P (Xt =
at) = pt and P (Xt = bt) = qt, respectively. It is not difficult to check that, for xt ∈ {at, bt},
I(Xt = xt) = P (Xt = xt)
(
1 +
(Xt − atpt − btqt)(xt − atpt − btqt)
(at − bt)2ptqt
)
= P (Xt = xt)
(
1 +
(Xt − EXt)(xt − EXt)
(at − bt)2ptqt
)













where EXt = atpt + btqt = 0 and Var(Xt) = (bt − at)2ptqt are the mean and the variance of Xt.
Since the r.v.’s Xt satisfy property (1) with U`j replaced by X`j , j = 1, ..., k, similar to the proof
of Theorem 1 we have that, for all 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < · · · < jm, m = 2, 3, ..., and any xjk ∈ {ajk , bjk},
k = 1, 2, ...,m,





























= P (Xj1 = xj1)P (Xj2 = xj2)...P (Xjm = xjm).
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¥
Let Xt, t = 1, 2, ..., be an (=t)-martingale-difference sequence consisting of r.v.’s each of which
takes three values {−at, 0, at}. Denote by εt, t = 1, 2, ..., a sequence of i.i.d. symmetric Bernoulli
r.v.’s independent of (Xt)∞t=1. The following theorem provides an upper bound for the expectation
of arbitrary convex function of Xt in terms of the expectation of the same function of the r.v.’s
εt.
Theorem 3 If f : Rn → R is a function convex in each of its arguments, then the following
inequality holds:
Ef(X1, ..., Xn) ≤ Ef(a1ε1, ..., anεn). (2)
Proof Let =̄0 = =n. For t = 1, 2, ..., n, denote by =̄t the σ-algebra spanned by the r.v.’s
X1, X2, ..., Xn, ε1, ..., εt. Further, let, for t = 0, 1, ..., n, Et stand for the conditional expectation
operator E(·|=̄t) and let ηt, t = 1, ..., n, denote the r.v.’s ηt = Xt + εtI(Xt = 0).
Using conditional Jensen’s inequality, we have
Ef(X1, X2, ..., Xn) = Ef(X1 + E0[ε1I(X1 = 0)], X2, ..., Xn)
≤ E[E0f(X1 + ε1I(X1 = 0), ..., X2, ..., Xn)] = Ef(η1, X2, ..., Xn). (3)
Similarly, for t = 2, ..., n,
Ef(η1, η2, ..., ηt−1, Xt, Xt+1, ..., Xn)
= Ef(η1, η2, ..., ηt−1, Xt + Et−1[εtI(Xt = 0)], Xt+1, ..., Xn)
≤ E[Et−1f(η1, η2, ..., ηt−1, Xt + εtI(Xt = 0), Xt+1, ..., Xn)]
= Ef(η1, η2, ..., ηt−1, ηt, Xt+1, ..., Xn). (4)
From equations (3) and (4) by induction it follows that
Ef(X1, X2, ..., Xn) ≤ Ef(η1, η2, ..., ηn). (5)
It is easy to see that the r.v.’s ηt, t = 1, 2, ..., n, form a martingale-difference sequence with
respect to the sequence of σ-algebras =̄0 ⊆ =̄1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ =̄t ⊆ · · ·, and each of them takes two values
{−at, at}. Therefore, from Theorems 1 and 2 we get that ηt, t = 1, 2, ..., n are jointly independent,
and therefore, the random vector (η1, η2, ..., ηn) has the same distribution as (a1ε1, a2ε2, ..., anεn).
This and (5) imply estimate (2). ¥
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3 Distributions of Sign Test Statistics for Dependent Observa-
tions4
The present section of the paper reviews the results in Ibragimov and Brown (2005) on the
distributional properties of the sign tests for martingale-difference sequences that provide the
basis for the development of the statistical procedures in Section 4, based on signs of dependent
observations.
Let Xn, n = 1, 2, ..., be an (=n)-conditionally symmetric martingale-difference sequence (so
that P (Xn < x|=n−1) = P (Xn < −x|=n−1), n = 1, 2, ..., for all x > 0) consisting of r.v.’s each of
which takes three values {−an, 0, an}. Further, let, for z ∈ R, sign(z) denote the sign of z defined
by sign(z) = 1, if z > 0, sign(z) = −1, if z < 0, and sign(0) = 0.
As before, throughout Sections 3 and 4, εn, n = 1, 2, ..., stands for a sequence of i.i.d. symmetric
Bernoulli r.v.’s independent of Xn, n = 1, 2, ...; in addition to that, in what follows, we denote by
Z the standard normal r.v. if not stated otherwise.
Theorem 4 The r.v.’s ηt = sign(Xt) + εtI(Xt = 0) are i.i.d. symmetric Bernoulli r.v.’s.
Proof The theorem follows from Theorem 1 since, as it is easy to see, the r.v.’s (ηt) form an
(=t)-martingale-difference sequence and each of them takes two values −1 and 1. ¥
Corollary 1 The statistic Sn = (
∑n
t=1 sign(Xt) + εtI(Xt = 0) + n)/2 has Binomial distribution
Bin(n, 1/2) with parameters n and p = 1/2.
Proof The corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 For any function f : Rn → R convex in each of its arguments,
Ef(sign(X1), sign(X2), ..., sign(Xn)) ≤ Ef(ε1, ε2, ..., εn).
Proof The theorem follows from Theorem 3 applied to the martingale-difference sequence Yn =
sign(Xn), n = 1, 2, ..., consisting of r.v.’s each of which takes three values {−1, 0, 1}. ¥











t=1 εt − c, 0)
(x− c) . (6)
4The classical reference for sign tests with independent observations is Lehmann (1986).
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Proof The corollary is an immediate consequence of Markov’s inequality and Theorem 5 applied
to the functions fc(x1, x2, ..., xn) = max(
∑n
t=1 xt − c, 0), 0 < c < x. ¥
Remark 1 For a fixed x > 0, consider the class of functions φ satisfying φ(y) =
∫ y
0 max(y −
u, 0)dF (u), y ≥ 0, φ(y) = 0, y < 0, and φ(x) = ∫ x0 max(x − u, 0)dF (u) = 1, for a nonnegative















for all φ. It is not difficult to show, similar to Proposition 4 in Eaton (1974) (see also the
discussion following Theorem 5 in de la Peña, Ibragimov and Jordan, 2004, for related optimality
results for bounds on the expected payoffs of contingent claims in the binomial model) that bound













t=1 εt − c, 0)
x− c .
The following result gives sharp bounds for the tail probabilities of the normalized sum of sign
of the r.v.’s Xt in terms of (generalized) moments of the standard normal r.v.















x− c ≤ inf0<c<x
(E[max(Z − c, 0)]3)1/3
x− c . (8)
Proof Using Markov’s inequality and Theorem 5 applied to the functions


































≤ E[max(Z − c, 0)]3 (10)
for all c > 0 implied by the results in Eaton (1974). ¥
Let (Xt), n = 1, 2, ..., and (Yn), n = 1, 2, ..., be two (=n)-adapted sequences.
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The following results provide analogues of Theorem 4 and Corollaries 1–3 that concern the
distributional properties of sign tests for equality of conditional distributions of two adapted
sequences (Xn) and (Yn). They follow from Theorem 4 and Corollaries 1–3 applied to the r.v.’s
Zn = Xn − Yn that form a conditionally symmetric martingale-difference sequence under the
assumption that the conditional distributions of (Xn) and (Yn) are the same.
Theorem 6 If the conditional (on =n−1) distributions of (Xn) and (Yn) are the same:
L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1), then the r.v.’s η̃n = sign(Xn−Yn)+εnI(Xn = Yn) are i.i.d. symmetric
Bernoulli r.v.’s.
Corollary 4 If the conditional (on =n−1) distributions of (Xn) and (Yn) are the same:
L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1), then the statistic S̃n = (
∑n
t=1 sign(Xt−Yt)+ εtI(Xt−Yt)+n)/2 has
Binomial distribution Bin(n, 1/2) with parameters n and p = 1/2.
Corollary 5 If the conditional (on =n−1) distributions of (Xn) and (Yn) are the same:
L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1), then, for any function f : Rn → R convex in each of its arguments,
Ef(sign(X1 − Y1), sign(X2 − Y2), ..., sign(Xn − Yn)) ≤ Ef(ε1, ε2, ..., εn).
Corollary 6 If the conditional (on =n−1) distributions of (Xn) and (Yn) are the same:











t=1 εt − c, 0)
x− c .
Corollary 7 If the conditional (on =n−1) distributions of (Xn) and (Yn) are the same:
L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1), then, for any x > 0,
P
(∑n












x− c ≤ inf0<c<x
(E[max(Z − c, 0)]3)1/3
x− c .
Remark 2 Bounds for the tail probabilities of sums of bounded r.v.’s forming a conditionally
symmetric martingale-difference sequence implied by the results in the present section provide bet-
ter estimates than many inequalities implied, in the trinomial setting, by well-known estimates in
martingale theory. In particular, from Markov’s inequality and Theorem 5 applied to the function
f(x1, x2, ..., xn) = exp(h
∑n
t=1 utxt), h > 0, it follows that the tail probability P (
∑n
t=1 Xt > x),
x > 0, of the sum of r.v.’s Xt that take three values {−ut, 0, ut} is bounded from above by





































is implied by the corresponding bounds on the expectation of exponents of weighted i.i.d. Bernoulli
r.v.’s E exp(h
∑n
t=1 utεt) (see Hoeffding, 1963; Azuma, 1967). More generally, Markov’s inequal-
ity and Theorem 5 imply the following bound for the tail probabilities of three-valued r.v.’s forming














where the infimum is taken over convex increasing functions φ : R→ R+. It is easy to see that
estimate (13) is better than Hoeffding–Azuma inequality (12) since the latter follows from choosing
a particular (close to optimal) h in estimates for the right-hand side of (11) which is a particular
case of (13) (see Hoeffding, 1963).
4 Sign Tests under Dependence
As discussed in Ibragimov and Brown (2005), from the results in the previous section it follows that
sign tests for testing the null hypothesis that (Xn) is an (=n)-conditionally symmetric martingale-
difference sequence with P (Xn > x|=n−1) = P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, or that the conditional
distributions of two adapted sequences (Xn) and (Yn) are the same (L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1)
for all n) can be based on the procedures described below. As most of the testing procedures
in statistics and econometrics, they can be classified as falling into one of the following classes:
exact tests, conservative tests and testing procedures based on asymptotic approximations. The
exact tests are based on the fact that, according to Corollaries 1 and 4, the distribution of the
transformation of signs in the model is known precisely to be Binomial and thus the statistical
inference can be based on critical values for the sum of i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v.’s (the case of exact
randomized ER tests below). The asymptotic tests use approximations for the quantiles of the
Binomial distribution in terms of the limiting normal distribution (the case of asymptotic ran-
domized AR tests). The conservative testing procedures in the present section are based on sharp
estimates for the tail probabilities of sums of dependent signs in the model in terms of sums
of i.i.d. Bernoulli or normal r.v.’s implied by Corollaries 2, 3, 6 and 7 and corresponding esti-
mates for the critical values of the sign tests for dependent observations in terms of quantiles of
the Binomial or Gaussian distributions (Binomial conservative non-randomized BCN and normal
conservative non-randomized NCN testing procedures). The classification of the sign tests in the
present section as non-randomized or randomized refers, respectively, to whether the inference
12
is based on the original (three-valued) signs sign(Xt) (resp., sign(Xt − Yt)) in the model with
dependent observations or the r.v.’s sign(Xt − Yt) + εtI(Xt = Yt)) that form, according to the
results in the previous section, a sequence of symmetric i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v.’s.
1. The exact randomized (ER) sign test with the test statistic S(1)n = (
∑n
t=1 sign(Xt) +
εtI(Xt = 0) + n)/2 rejects the null hypothesis P (Xn > x|=n−1) = P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for
all n in favor of P (Xn > x|=n−1) > P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for all n at the significance level
α ∈ (0, 1/2), if Sn > Bα, where Bα is the (1−α)-quantile of the Binomial distribution Bin(n, 1/2).
Using the central limit theorem for the statistic (
∑n
t=1 sign(Xt)+εtI(Xt = 0))/
√
n, in the case
of large sample sizes n one can also use the following asymptotic version of the previous testing
procedure.
2. The asymptotic randomized (AR) sign test with the test statistic S(2)n = (
∑n
t=1 sign(Xt) +
εtI(Xt = 0) + n)/
√
n rejects the null hypothesis P (Xn > x|=n−1) = P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0,
for all n in favor of P (Xn > x|=n−1) > P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for all n at the significance
level α ∈ (0, 1/2), if Sn > zα, where zα is the (1−α)-quantile of the standard normal distribution
N (0, 1).
3. The binomial conservative non-randomized (BCN) sign test with the test statistic S(3)n =∑n
t=1 sign(Xt) rejects the null hypothesis P (Xn > x|=n−1) = P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for all
n in favor of P (Xn > x|=n−1) > P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for all n at the significance level





t=1 εt − c, 0)]
Bα − c < α.
4. The normal conservative non-randomized (NCN) sign test with the test statistic S(4)n =∑n
t=1 sign(Xt) rejects the null hypothesis P (Xn > x|=n−1) = P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for all
n in favor of P (Xn > x|=n−1) > P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, for all n at the significance level
α ∈ (0, 1/2), if Sn > zα, where zα is such that
inf
0<c<zα
(E[max(Z − c, 0]3)1/3
zα − c < α.
The analogues of the above tests in the case of the two-sided alternative P (Xn > x|=n−1) 6=
P (Xn < −x|=n−1) are completely similar.
The tests also have the following analogues for testing the null hypothesis that conditional
distributions of components of two adapted sequences are the same: L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1).5
1. The exact randomized (ER) sign test with the test statistic S̃(1)n = (
∑n
t=1 sign(Xt) +
εtI(Xt = 0) + n)/2 rejects the null hypothesis L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1) for all n in favor of the
5We describe the tests for the two-sided alternative since this is usually the case of interest in most of the
applications.
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(two-sided) hypothesis L(Xn|=n−1) 6= L(Yn|=n−1) for all n at the significance level α ∈ (0, 1/2),










α/2 are, respectively, the (α/2)- and (1 − α/2)-
quantiles of the Binomial distribution Bin(n, 1/2).





n rejects the null hypothesis L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1) for all n in favor of
L(Xn|=n−1) 6= L(Yn|=n−1) for all n at the significance level α ∈ (0, 1/2), if
∣∣∣S̃(2)n
∣∣∣ > zα/2, where
zα/2 is the (1− α/2)-quantiles of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1).
3. The binomial conservative non-randomized (BCN) sign test with the test statistics S̃(3)n =∑n
t=1 sign(Xt − Yt) rejects the null hypothesis L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1) for all n in favor of
L(Xn|=n−1) 6= L(Yn|=n−1) for all n at the significance level α ∈ (0, 1/2), if
∣∣∣S̃(3)n
∣∣∣ > Bα/2, where





t=1 εt − c, 0)
Bα/2 − c
< α/2.
4. The normal conservative non-randomized (NCN) sign test with the test statistic S̃(4)n =∑n
t=1 sign(Xt − Yt) rejects the null hypothesis L(Xn|=n−1) = L(Yn|=n−1) for all n in favor of
L(Xn|=n−1) 6= L(Yn|=n−1) for all n at the significance level α ∈ (0, 1/2),
∣∣∣S̃(4)n
∣∣∣ > zα/2, where
zα/2 is such that
inf
0<c<Bα/2
(E[max(Z − c, 0)]3)1/3
zα/2 − c
< α/2.
For illustration, in Table 1 in the Appendix, we provide the results on calculations of the
power of the AR sign test for testing the null hypothesis H0 : P (Xn > x|=n−1) = P (Xn <
−x|=n−1), x > 0, for all n against particular cases of the alternative hypothesis, namely, against
the alternatives P (Xn > x|=n−1) > P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, such that P (Xn > 0|=n−1) = p >
1 − p = P (Xn < 0|=n−1), where p ∈ (1/2, 1] (the power of other tests discussed in the present
section against this particular alternative may be calculated in complete similarity). One should
note that, as it is not difficult to see, the power calculations are the same for the AR test for
testing H0 against the alternatives P (Xn > x|=n−1) > P (Xn < −x|=n−1), x > 0, such that
P (Xn > 0|=n−1) = p1 > q1 = P (Xn < 0|=n−1), where p1, q1 ∈ [0, 1] and 1/2 + (p1 − q1)/2 =
p. They are also the same for the AR sign test for testing the null hypothesis of equality of
conditional distributions of two (=t)-adapted sequences Xt and Yt against the alternative that
P (Xt > Yt|=t−1) = p2 > 1/2 > q2 = P (Yt > Yt|=t−1), where p2, q2 ∈ [0, 1] are such that
1/2 + (p2 − q2)/6 = p. According to the table, the test has very good power properties, even in
the case of small samples.
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5 The Casino Affect
There are two major challenges to testing a theory of affective decision making predicated on
equilibrium outcomes in an intrapersonal game. First, how do you elicit behavior consistent with
the existence of Nash equilibrium in a strategic form game? Second, given a small sample of
dependent observations of this behavior — as is often the case in experimental economics when
there is learning, see Camerer (1995) — how do you carry out the statistical analysis?
To answer the first question, we turn to Sprumont’s (2000) paper on collective choice theories.





Sprumont proposes that we consider the game and all of its subgames, i.e., both columns and
both rows. Suppose the outcomes in these games are x1, x2, x3, x4, and x5. That is, x1 is the
outcome in the subgame defined by c1; x2 is the outcome in the subgame defined by c2; x3 is the
outcome in the subgame defined by r1; x4 is the outcome in the subgame defined by r2; and x5 is
the outcome in the game. The following proposition is Theorem 1 in Sprumont (2000, p. 211).
Proposition x5 is a Nash equilibrium of the game iff it is the chosen outcome in its row and
in its column.
Moreover, Sprumont observes in his Theorem 1′, on page 212, that the game is a potential game
relative to some ranking of the outcomes iff it has a Nash equilibrium — his term is team-
rationalizable rather than a potential game.
Following Sprumont, we construct a 2 × 2 intrapersonal, strategic form game as a model of
affective decision making, where we elicit choices for the game and all of its subgames.
Suppose two imaginary casinos: Winners and Losers. Subjects are divided into two equal
groups. Each “winner” is paired anonomously with a “loser.” There are four decks of cards in
each casino, say A, B, C, and D. The decks have different random payoffs. In the Winners’
casino, the only payoffs are monetary, but in the Losers’ casino, the cards have both monetary
and affective payoffs. In each casino, subjects are told the composition of the various decks, i.e.,
the payoffs and the probability of the payoffs in their casino.
A game consists of five rounds, where in each of the first four rounds the subjects are asked
to choose from the columns and rows of the following matrix in Figure 2.6





More precisely, in the first subgame of each game, each of the two subjects is asked to choose
between decks (A,C); in the second subgame, the subjects choose between (B, D); in the third
round, they choose between (A,B); and in the forth round of each game, the choice is between
(C,D).
In the fifth round, the subjects are asked to choose a deck from all four decks.
These are computerized games and subjects learn their outcomes after each round. Moreover,
after each round they also learn the monetary payoffs of their “partner” in the other casino, but
the “winners” don’t observe the affective payoffs of the “losers.” That is, winners and losers have
different information sets in the sense that the winners only observe part of what the losers observe
in each round. However, the information sets generated by the observed monetary payoffs are the
same for both the paired players (see below).
The decks are constructed such that Bracha’s model predicts the choices of the “winners” will
be Nash equilibria on the diagonal {A,D} and the choices of the “losers” will be Nash equilibria
on the diagonal {B,C}. That is, in the casino for losers, the decks B and C have “positive”
images, e.g., flowers or smiling faces, and decks A and D have “negative” images, e.g., snakes or
angry faces.
Several testable hypotheses are of interest for the model.
First, it is of interest to test the strongest (among all the testable conclusions for the model
described in this section) behavioral hypothesis whether seeing “positive” or “negative” images
affects the players’ choices between decks in the casino for losers.
It is natural to assume that players’ decisions in each subgame in both casinos depend only on
the outcomes of previous rounds observed by them. Thus, if the opposite of the above hypothesis
holds and seeing the images has no effect on the losers’ decisions, then, provided that each subject
observes the outcomes played by her and her partner, the following statement (the null) holds:
H
(1)
0 : Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a subject and her partner in
the other casino, the current choices for both paired subjects are the same.




a1 (two-sided alternative): Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a
subject and her partner in the other casino, the current choices for both paired subjects in the
first four subgames are (always) different from each other (that is, the choices of the paired players
are the opposites of each other, so that if a winner chooses A in the first subgame then her loser




a2 (one-sided alternative): Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a
subject and her partner in the other casino, the winner chooses decks A or D in each of the five
subgames and the loser chooses B or C in each of the subgames (in other words, the winners
always choose a deck with a better expected monetary payoffs; the losers, on the other hand,
always choose a deck which is worse in terms of the monetary payoffs but is more preferable in
terms of its images).
Of course, one can consider the analogues of the above hypotheses restricted to the first four
subgames in each game or to the fifth round in each game only.
In order to be able to conduct tests of the above hypotheses, it is important that the players’
choices are adapted to the same filtration generated by the monetary outcomes they both observe.
In other words, if seeing the images has no effect on the losers’ decisions, then the players’ decisions
are determined only by the outcomes in the previous rounds in both of the casinos that both the
subject and her partner observe. Indeed, if this is the case and the above null hypothesis H(1)0
holds then the players’ payoffs in each subgame have the same distributions conditional on the
information set of the previous outcomes they both have the access to. Thus, the machinery for
testing equality of conditional distributions of two adapted sequences (of payoffs) described in
Sections 3 and 4 can be used to make inferences on the hypotheses of interest. The importance
of the assumption that the random sequences of interest in Sections 3 and 4 are adapted to the
same filtration is the reason why the subjects are paired in the experiment and observe not only
their own payoffs but also the payoffs of their partners.




0 : Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a subject and her partner in
the other casino, the distribution of current payoffs for both paired subjects is the same.
The two sided alternative for the null hypothesis is, naturally, the following:
H
(2)
a1 (two-sided alternative): Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a
subject and her partner in the other casino, the distribution of current payoffs for both paired
subjects are different from each other.
The one-sided distributional alternative to H(2)0 can be formulated as follows.
H
(2)
a2 (one-sided alternative): Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a
subject and her partner in the other casino, the winners’ monetary payoffs are likely to be greater
than those of losers.
Note that, since the behavioral null hypothesis H(1)0 is evidently stronger than the distribu-
tional null hypothesis H(2)0 , then rejection of H
(2)
0 also implies rejection of H
(1)
0 .





0 : Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a subject and her partner in
the other casino, the distribution of current payoffs from the diagonal AD for both paired subjects
is the same.
The alternative that can be regarded as an analogue of the above alternative hypothesis H(1)a2
(in the case of the null H(3)0 ) is the following.
H
(3)
a : Conditional on the outcomes of previous rounds played by a subject and her partner
in the other casino, the winners’ monetary payoffs from the diagonal AD are likely to be greater
than those of losers from the same diagonal.
The terms “likely to be greater than” in the alternative hypotheses H(2)a2 and H
(3)
a above can
be made operational and formalized as follows. Let π(1)t and π
(2)
t be the sequences of monetary
payoffs of interest (either from each subgame or those from the diagonal AD) for winners and
losers adapted to the same filtration =t (see the next section for details). If the winners’ monetary
payoffs are likely to dominate those of losers conditionally on the information sets =t−1 of previous
outcomes that they both observe, then P (π(1)t > π
(2)
t |=t−1) > P (π(1)t < π(2)t |=t−1) for all t.
This a precise formulation of the alternatives to the null hypotheses of equality of conditional
distributions L(π(1)t |=t−1) = L(π(2)t |=t−1) for all t in H(2)0 and H(3)0 that imply, in particular, that
P (π(1)t > π
(2)
t |=t−1) = P (π(1)t < π(2)t |=t−1) (see also the notes on calculations of power of the sign
tests at the end of Section 4).
It is important to note that, according to the results reviewed in Section 2, the above formula-
tions of the null hypotheses and the one-sided alternatives are, in fact, the statements concerning
martingale vs. submartingale behavior of the sums of signs of differences of the subjects’ payoffs
in each of the casinos. For instance, from the results in Section 2 it follows that the null hypothesis
H
(2)
0 is equivalent to the statement that the sum of three-valued signs
∑
sign(π(1)t − π(2)t ) is a
conditionally symmetric martingale with respect to the filtration that both players observe. The
one-sided hypothesis H(2)a1 , on the other hand, is equivalent to the statement that this sum of signs
is a submartingale with respect to the same filtration.
The next section proposes a statistical model for conducting the tests. This will address the
second challenge, raised above.
6 Sign Tests for the Casino Affect
Suppose that each of the subjects plays the game described in the previous section N times. In
order to maintain incentive to pay attention to the outcomes of their partners’ games, at the end
of the last game, the subjects are allowed to choose between the two casinos and to play in the
casino of their choice N more times.
Let XA, XB, XC , and XD stand for random variables representing monetary payoffs from
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decks A, B, C, and D, respectively. Further, let Ytj and Ztj , t = 1, 2, ..., 5N , j ∈ {A,B, C,D},
stand for the subject’s decision variables for choices in the tth subgame, so that Ytj = 1, if the
first subject chooses deck j in the subgame and Ytj = 0 otherwise; Ztj = 1, if the second subject
chooses deck j in the subgame and Ztj = 0 otherwise (note that YtB = YtD = ZtB = ZtD = 0 if
t = 5m− 4; YtA = YtC = ZtA = ZtC = 0 if t = 5m− 3; YtC = YtD = ZtC = ZtD = 0 if t = 5m− 2;
YtA = YtB = ZtA = ZtB = 0 if t = 5m− 1, where m is the number of the game, m = 1, ..., N).






tD), i = 1, 2, denote, respectively, the i−th subjects’ payoffs from decks






tD), i = 1, 2, t = 1, ..., N, are indepen-
dent copies of (XtA, XtB, XtC , XtD).





tA YtA + X
(1)
tB YtB + X
(1)








tA ZtA + X
(2)
tB ZtB + X
(2)
tC ZtC + X
(2)
tD ZtD.
On the other hand, the subjects’ payoffs from the diagonal {A,D} in the last subgame t = 5m


























5m−j , m = 1, 2, ..., N, denote the players’ total
payoffs in the first 4 subgames of game m.


















k = 1, 2, ..., t. The players’ decision variables Ytj , and Ztj , j ∈ {A,B, C,D} are =t−1-measurable.
The hypotheses described in the previous section have precise formalization in terms of the
variables defined above.
For instance, the behavioral null hypothesis H(1)0 is equivalent to the hypothesis that, condi-
tionally on =t−1, Ytj = Ztj , j ∈ {A, B,C, D} (a.s.).
The distributional null hypothesis H(2)0 restricted to the first four subgames can be formally
written in terms of the equality of conditional distributions for the payoffs in each of those sub-




0 restricted to the last subgames of each game can be formally written in terms of the
equality of conditional distributions of the payoffs from the diagonal AD in the fifth subgame of
game m : L(π̃(1)t |=t−1) = L(π̃(2)t |=t−1), t = 5m.
As discussed in the previous section, the natural alternatives to the above null hypotheses are
H
(2)
a1 (two-sided distributional alternative): L(π(1)t |=t−1) 6= L(π(2)t |=t−1), t = 5m − j, j =
1, 2, 3, 4.
H
(2)
a2 (one-sided distributional alternative for payoffs in the first four subgames of each game):
P (π(1)t > π
(2)
t |=t−1) > P (π(1)t < π(2)t |=t−1), t = 5m− j, j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
H
(2)
a3 (one-sided distributional alternative for payoffs from the diagonal AD in the last subgame
of each game): P (π̃(1)t > π̃
(2)
t |=t−1) > P (π̃(1)t < π̃(2)t |=t−1), t = 5m.
Various joint analogues of the above hypotheses involving both the payoffs from each of the
four subgames as well as those from the diagonal AD in the last subgame or the total payoffs in
each game can be considered as well.
As follows from the results discussed in Sections 2-4 of the present paper, exact and conser-
vative sign tests for different hypotheses on behavioral differences in the two games can be based







































































(sign(Π(1)m −Π(2)m ) + εmI(Π(1)m = Π(2)m )) +

















(π(1)t − π(2)t ) + εtI(π(1)t = π(2)t )
)
.
where εt, ε̃t, t = 1, 2, ..., 5N , denote independent symmetric Bernoulli random variables indepen-












tC ZtC , X
(2)
tD ZtD, t = 1, 2, ..., 5N
(and, thus, independent of =5N ).
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The test statistics S(1)4N provides a device for testing the null hypothesis H
(2)
0 (and of H
(1)
0 )
against the alternative H(2)a1 or H
(2)
a2 . The statistic S
(2)





two-sided analogue. The interpretation of other statistics is similar, with, for instance, S(3)N being
a test statistics for the analogue of the distributional null hypothesis H(2)0 for the total payoffs
from the first four subgames.
For instance, under the null hypothesis H(1)0 that, conditionally on =t−1, Ytj = Ztj , j ∈
{A,B,C, D} (a.s.) (and, thus, H(2)0 also holds), the distribution of the statistic S(1)4N/2 + 2N is
binomial with parameters 4N and p = 0.5: S(1)4N/2 + 2N ∼ Bin(4N, 0.5); P (S(1)4N/2 + 2N = k) =
Ck4N/2
4N = pk; k = 0, 1, ..., 4N , where Ck4N = (4N)!/(k!(4N − k)!).
Indeed, under the null, the random variable
π
(1)
t − π(2)t = X(1)tA YtA + X(1)tB YtB + X(1)tC YtC + X(1)tD YtD −
(X(2)tA ZtA + X
(2)
tB ZtB + X
(2)
tC ZtC + X
(2)
tD ZtD) =
(X(1)tA −X(2)tA )YtA + (X(1)tB −X(2)tB )YtB + (X(1)tC −X(2)tC )YtC + (X(1)tD −X(2)tD )YtD
is symmetric conditional on =t−1. Therefore, P (s(1)t = 1|=t−1) = P (s(1)t = −1|=t−1) = 1/2, and
s
(1)
t is a martingale difference with respect to (=t)t.















kDYkD, k = 1, 2, ..., t − 1, are such
that YtA = 1 (so that, YtB = YtC = YtD = 0). Then, conditionally on =t−1, we have that







P (X(1)tA = X
2
tA)















P (X(1)tA > X
(2)





= P (s(1)t = −1)
since X(1)tA and X
(2)
tA are independent copies of each other. In complete similarity we have that
P (s(1)t = 1) = P (s
(1)
t = −1) = 12 in the case when YtC = 1 and, thus, YtA = YtC = YtD = 0).
By Theorem 6 and Corollary 4 we have that the random variables s(1)t , t = 1, 2, ..., 4N ,
are jointly independent symmetric Bernoulli random variables and, therefore, S4N/2 + 2N ∼
Bin(4N, 0.5).
Similar conclusions concerning independence also hold for the summands in all the other
statistics in the present section and, thus, the wide range of the sign tests described in Section 4
is applicable for hypotheses testing.
For instance, the exact randomized ER test (see Section 4) rejects the null hypothesis H(1)0
that, conditionally on =t−1, Ytj = Ztj , j ∈ {A,B,C, D} (a.s.), for the two-sided alternative H(2)a1 :
Ytj 6= Ztj (and also rejects the distributional null hypothesis H(2)0 : L(π(1)t |=t−1) = L(π(2)t |=t−1),
21
t = 5m− j, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, for the subjects’ payoffs from the first four subgames in favor of the two-
sided alternative H(2)a1 : L(π(1)t |=t−1) 6= L(π(2)t |=t−1)) at the significance level α if S(1)4N/2 + 2N <
Kα or S
(1)







The sign tests based on the above statistics can be conducted, in complete similarity, for all
other null hypotheses and the alternatives discussed in the previous and in this section.
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Table 1. Power of the AR sign test for testing  
)|()|( 11 −− ℑ<=ℑ> nnnn xXPxXP against the alternative 
,0),|()|( 11 >ℑ−<>ℑ> −− xxXPxXP nnnn   
with )|0(15.0)|0( 11 −− ℑ<=−>>=ℑ> nnnn XPppXP  
(N  denotes the number of observations) 
 
p 
N 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 150 200 250 300 500 1000 
0.55 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.44 0.53 0.60 0.66 0.83 0.97
0.60 0.17 0.25 0.29 0.44 0.45 0.56 0.65 0.64 0.71 0.76 0.86 0.93 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00
0.65 0.26 0.42 0.51 0.69 0.73 0.83 0.89 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.70 0.38 0.61 0.73 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.75 0.53 0.79 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.80 0.68 0.91 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.85 0.82 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.90 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 
